From G. Alan Ferguson via the email list of Col. Wayne V. Morris, USMC (Ret)

By Dawn Lim and Ross Gianfortune dlim@govexec.com March 5, 2010Thursday evening's shootout between Pentagon police officers and a gunman apparently motivated by anti-government sentiment was the latest in a spate of attacks on federal employees and facilities and serves as a stark reminder that public servants too often find themselves unexpectedly in harm's way. The following timeline reviews major attacks during the past two decades.

Feb. 18, 2010. A small [single-engine plane] is flown into a building housing a federal tax office in Austin, Texas, injuring 13 and killing two. The pilot, Joseph Andrew Stack, was angry with the Internal Revenue Service.

Nov. 5, 2009. An Army psychiatrist goes on a rampage at Fort Hood, Texas, killing 13 people and wounding dozens. The alleged gunman, Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, was a Muslim who had been in contact with a radical Imam and was about to be deployed overseas.

June 1, 2009. A gunman opens fire on a U.S. military recruiting office in Little Rock, Ark., killing one soldier and wounding another. The suspect, a Muslim convert, opposed the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but was not affiliated with a larger terrorist network.

Sep. 12, 2006. Four Islamic militants armed with guns, grenades and a car bomb attack the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, killing one and injuring 14. The attack came at a time of heightened anti-American sentiment because of U.S. support for Israeli military action in Lebanon.

Sep. 18, 2001. Envelopes containing anthrax and notes with radical Islamist rhetoric are sent to news organizations and two senators. Five people die and at least 22 people -- including postal workers -- are infected. The FBI said Bruce Ivins, an Army biodefense expert who committed suicide in 2008, orchestrated the attacks himself.

Sep. 11, 2001. Hijackers linked to al Qaeda crash a commercial jet into the west side of the Pentagon, less than an hour after the World Trade Center came under attack. Passengers seize control of Flight 93 from hijackers and crash the plane, thought to have been headed for the Capitol or White House, into a field in Shanksville, Pa. 189 die in the Pentagon; 2,751 die in New York, and 40 die in Pennsylvania.

Oct. 12, 2000. An al Qaeda suicide attack damages the Navy destroyer USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, killing 17 sailors and injuring 39.

Aug. 7, 1998. Trucks loaded with explosives go off almost simultaneously outside U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, killing 233. A group linked to Egyptian Islamic Jihad took credit for the bombings, making Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri household names.

July 24, 1998. A paranoid schizophrenic enters the Capitol Building and opens fire, killing two police officers.

April 19, 1995. A homemade bomb destroys Oklahoma City's Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, injuring more than 800 and killing 168. Army veterans Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols were behind the attack, which caused $652 million worth of damage. They claimed they acted to protect the Constitution.

Oct. 29, 1994. A gunman fires a semiautomatic rifle from a fence outside at the White House's north lawn at a group of men, thinking President Clinton is among them. (Clinton was reportedly in the family residence watching a football game.) Tourists subdue Francisco Martin Duran and no one is injured in the attack.

Sept. 12, 1994. In an attempt to assassinate President Clinton, Frank Eugene Corder, an alcoholic and drug abuser, flies a stolen plane from Aldino Airport in Maryland into the White House lawn. He dies in the attack.

Feb. 26, 1993. A car bomb goes off below the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York, where some federal agency offices are located. The al Qaeda attack fails to bring down the towers as originally planned, but kills six and injures more than 1,000.

Jan. 25, 1993. A gunman fires on cars waiting near the entrance of the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Va., killing three agency employees and wounding two more. The shooter, Mir Aimal Kasi, was angry with U.S. policy in the Middle East.

All graduates of ITG’s weapons training programs will recognize the terminology ‘The Startle Reflex.’ It is because of The Startle Reflex that we strongly believe in scanning for threats with the finger OFF the trigger. This may be one example of an instance where such training would have saved the officer from a natural, physiological reaction that will likely be deemed a mistake.

From KSAZ Fox 10 TV in Phoenix, AZ

Police Sergeant Accidentally Shoots Man

Updated: Thursday, 11 Mar 2010, 12:14 PM MST
Published : Thursday, 11 Mar 2010, 5:49 AM MST

PHOENIX - A man wanted for pistol whipping another person is in critical condition after a Phoenix police officer accidentally shot him.

Officers tell us they were looking for the 27-year-old man because he had reportedly hit someone with a gun and threatened to kill them earlier in the day near 45th Street and Baseline Road.

Officers were told the suspect always carried a gun.

While looking for the man, they saw him leave an apartment. A sergeant had his weapon drawn and was turning a corner when he ran right into the suspect.

"He came to him face to face and he startled...and the sergeant's gun went off and struck the suspect in the shoulder." said Sgt. Tommy Thompson of the Phoenix Police Department.

Police say the suspect told people inside the apartment that if police tried to arrest him, he would "shoot it out" with them.

No other injuries were reported.

Thompson says the suspect had a pistol tucked in his waistband.

The 36-year-old sergeant will be placed on administrative leave, standard practice in officer-involved shootings.

From Hampton Roads, VA News Channel 3, WTKR.com

A sheriff's deputy who ended up in the hospital after accidentally shooting himself in the hand is talking about his gun handling skills as he prepares to run for Chowan County sheriff.

Chowan County Sheriff's Deputy Tim Brabble was cleaning his Glock handgun when it went off, shooting himself in his left hand. It happened two weeks ago today when Deputy Brabble was off duty and home alone. Speaking out for the first time about it, he is taking 100 percent of the blame.

"Unfortunately, just human error, I forgot to take one out of the chamber, no fault of the gun. I mean, the gun's a great gun. I still have it. I intend to carry it. I think Glock is a fine weapon, just human error, I forgot to unload the chamber," Deputy Brabble said.

Chances are he won't forget again.

"I have no excuse. I don't know why I did not unload it that day. I've been handling guns safely for 30 plus years and never made that mistake and for whatever reason, I just skipped that step."

Deputy Brabble says he was immediately upset with himself after he realized what had happened. He then called 911.

Deputy Brabble was brought to Sentara Norfolk General Hospital after he was taken to Chowan Hospital. He had emergency surgery on his hand at Sentara Norfolk General Hospital.

Deputy Brabble knows some people are firing off criticism about what happened, especially since he is running for Chowan County Sheriff this November.

"Critics can use it like they want. It doesn't change who I am as a person. I certainly intend to still run for sheriff and you know anybody that wants to talk to me about it, I'll be glad to talk to them," he said.

And as the dust settles, he wants his mistake to be a lesson for others.

"Make sure that your firearms are unloaded when you begin to take them apart. That is the utmost importance."

From Corporal Seamus’ email list
By Capt. Dale Dye USMC (Ret), Senior Military Advisor on HBO’s “The Pacific.”

It took nearly two years of hard campaigning to get it right but in March of this year American TV audiences will get an unflinching, historically accurate and very absorbing look at World War II in the Pacific as fought by men of the vaunted 1st Marine Division.

In my billet as the Senior Military Advisor for this monster undertaking, Executive Producer Tom Hanks gave me a set of deceptively simple marching orders: “Get up under the helmet of those Marines and take the audience on the trip they made to hell and back between 1942 and 1945.” That’s what we did over the year we spent in shooting the project which HBO has given a simple, evocative title: “The Pacific.”

And it’s what HBO subscribers will see when the first episode of the maxi-series airs on March 14. Like its hugely successful predecessor “Band of Brothers,” this series will be presented on HBO in ten one-hour episodes with plans to sell a boxed set sometime following initial TV release. A series of special sneak previews are being set up around the country including one for 1st MarDiv Marines and WW II vets at Camp Pendleton. Given what I saw every day for a full year on sets in Australia where we shot the series and the edits I’ve seen done over the past year in post-production, there’s no question Marines are going to love this series but I believe it will also find a huge following among civilians and veterans of other services who will quickly lock on to the drama, pathos and hardships faced by men who fought the war in the Pacific. We certainly did our best and spared no expense to recreate it.

My orders to the Warriors Inc. cadre who assisted me in the training and in daily on-set advising were direct and specific. We will do everything in our power to give audiences an insight to the thoughts, emotions and passions of men who faced a brutal, tenacious and unfamiliar enemy in the Pacific campaigns of World War II. It was immediately obvious we were facing a big challenge and one that was quite different from what we faced in doing “Band of Brothers,” which focused on one company of paratroopers from the 506th PIR of the famed 101st Airborne Division in the ETO.

This new project required us to raise, train and employ actors and special ability extras who would realistically portray WW II-era Marines from all three regiments of the 1st Marine Division. The focus is on three main characters: Gunnery Sergeant John Basilone from 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, PFC Eugene Sledge from 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines and Private Robert Leckie of 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines as the division fought from Guadalcanal to Cape Gloucester, Peleliu and on to Okinawa. Much of the source material for our scripts was taken from books written by the latter two Marines (With the Old breed at Peleliu and Okinawa by Sledge and Helmet for My Pillow by Leckie) so we had at least two early touchstones for historical research.

We immediately worked out a Table of Organization for a training unit and began to sketch in the details of a schedule designed to produce a credible WW II Marine infantry company in the fourteen days allotted prior to start of principal photography. All hands on the Warriors Inc. crew were advised to pack their seabags for a long deployment and begin researching WW II Marine Corps weapons, equipment, uniforms and tactics.

In Melbourne, the city in which the 1st Marine Division rested after the grueling campaign on Guadalcanal in 1943, my XO Mike Stokey (1st MarDiv CC in Vietnam from 1966-69) and I began to recruit Special Ability Extras who would be trained along with the cast members and support the mission throughout the production. All of the three hundred or so young Australian or New Zealand men we saw in the process of selecting fifty candidates were avid to be a part of the production but few of them had much more than a rudimentary knowledge of World War II. These guys – and the actors who were being cast back in the States and in the UK – would need plenty of background information to effectively portray the young Americans who volunteered for Marine Corps service in World War II.

Stokey and I also used this trip to interview and hire thirty Asian extras that would be trained as Imperial Japanese infantrymen to oppose our Marines. We’ve always believed that the most effective portrayals of combat derive from using a skilled adversary rather than cartoon characters in enemy uniforms. For “The Pacific” we deemed this a vital concern. Despite propaganda portrayals from the period, IJA soldiers were anything but cartoons. Just ask any WW II Pacific combat veteran. To effectively communicate the jeopardy and the difficulties encountered by our forces facing tenacious and dedicated Japanese forces in the Pacific, we needed an on-screen enemy that demonstrated those characteristics.

As the principal actors began to arrive in Australia, we moved to Far North Queensland and set up for training in a huge patch of triple-canopy jungle running up the slopes of steep hills. With our CP established, we began to amass the weapons, ammunition, rations and canvas we’d require when the troops arrived. From this remote site we’d conduct a curriculum that ran the military gamut from terrain appreciation, through tactical formations and movement, to fire and maneuver and into combat engagements between our Marines and the Japanese forces training at a site nearby. We took an absolutely minimalist approach to creature comforts as we wanted our trainees to experience life in the field as it was lived by World War II Marines who were chronically short of everything except Japanese enemy.

Our training command was organized into three platoons: Assault Platoon, Machinegun Platoon and Mortar Platoon, each commanded by a Marine veteran and member of my Warriors staff. I commanded the training company with Stokey as my XO. When the troops arrived for transport to the training area, they were issued a seabag with World War II Marine dungarees, boondockers and period field equipment which left them both clueless and apprehensive. That situation was reinforced as the NCOs gave them a typical welcome based on personal experience with Marine Drill Instructors. It was loud, profane and scary which served to put our trainees in the desired mind-set: numb, sweaty and confused. That’s precisely the way we wanted them to be for reasons based on my own Marine Corps experience and what I’ve learned over the past 25 years about performing in military movies.

I’ve always believed the most effective training tactic is to work from the inside out rather than the other way around. You can train actors to walk, talk, maneuver and handle weapons appropriately – and that’s been done by others before me – but the real convincing performances come from the heart and from places deep in the brain that are unreachable without full and complete immersion in the alien experience of intimacy, lack of privacy, total inter-dependency, deprivation, hardship and unselfish devotion to a larger ideal that only those who have served in the military can understand. The idea is simply to give the performers a large, unavoidable dose of experience with the way real military people must feel, think and function to survive.

Any Leatherneck would recognize the regimen. Isolate them completely; no cell phones and no contact whatsoever with the world outside their training unit. From the start, work them hard in physical training and manual labor such as calisthenics, long formation runs and digging their own fighting positions until they are numb and focused exclusively on surviving the next five minutes. At that point, you have a blank slate and an open heart. We quickly launched on a steep learning curve during which the trainees gradually worked their way up into the appropriate positions of leadership and followership called for in the scripts.

A typical training day in the field went something like this. All hands muster at 0500 which was a bit shaky since we’d been on fifty percent alert throughout the previous night which was punctuated in thrilling fashion by a Japanese probe of our lines. No breakfast was allowed as we felt two ration meals in a 24 hour period would reduce body fat and give us the slim, slightly underfed look we’d need in the first episode covering Guadalcanal. We formed for PT at 0530, did calisthenics and then launched on a four-mile formation run. Following PT, we set the platoons against each other in full-contact close-quarters battle and bayonet drills with sheathed blades on M-1 rifles and carbines.

By 0800 we were on our firing line with blanks ammo streaming through Garand rifles, BARs and carbines. During our field training period, our people had to become intimately familiar not only with the M-1 rifle, carbine, Thompson SMG and BAR infantry combinations that Marines carried beginning in 1943 but they had to master the M1903A1 Springfield bolt-action rifles and M1917 water-cooled heavy machineguns required for the Guadalcanal sequences prior to the Corps’ adoption of the more modern weapons systems during WWW II.

While the riflemen worked on the firing line, Machinegun Platoon conducted gun drills – blank fire in support of maneuvering squads, displace, and re-engage area targets – while the Mortar Platoon conducted missions with the 60mm mortars firing creeping barrages with shells that give a satisfactory and attention-grabbing blast via 12-gauge shotgun shells embedded in the base of dummy HE rounds.

After noon chow, we briefed a company-sized reconnaissance patrol that would take us via compass heading through the heavy green to the top of a jungle covered hill where listening posts had reported enemy movement. Prior to moving out we issued the machetes we’d need to cut through the bush and conducted a review of field telephone and wire procedures that would keep everyone in contact with the CP. Field radios were notoriously unreliable in World War II and we reinforced that concept by requiring the Wire Section of Assault Platoon to constantly run lines and keep maneuvering units in contact via EE-8 field phones.

As we began to climb and cut through the tangle of vines and undergrowth under field marching packs (approximately 40 very real pounds of weight including rations and water) the heat smashed into us. The humidity in this jungle often matched the air temperature and those who rolled up their sleeves or unbuttoned their dungaree shirts rapidly became familiar with stinging nettles that added significantly to the agony of the march. The jungle climb was particularly difficult for machinegunners and mortarmen who had to hump all their T/E gear and a basic unit of fire. A pre-planned firefight with our Japanese training on the reverse slope of that jungle hill significantly lightened their load and gave them some excellent feeling for fighting at close range in a thick jungle. Machinegun crews had to constantly displace in support of the creeping infantry squads closing on enemy hard-points. Mortars were working their sights and tubes according to a rapid rate of adjustments I was sending to them via wire with the student officers observing the technique.

When we returned to the CP, cleaned all weapons and ate parts of a second meal, we opened the schoolhouse to conduct lectures on Marine Corps history, the state of the world and the U.S. in the war years, and worked on 1940s vocabulary and Marine jargon. When the inky darkness particular to Pacific jungles descended we set the watch and waited for the pre-planned, full-scale banzai assault that we’d arranged for some time close to 2200 when heads would be nodding on our perimeter. By the time we were hit in a sector defended by a pair of water-cooled machineguns, the troops were demonstrating admirable fire discipline. Our mortars fired a night area suppression mission to drive off the attackers.

And that was just one training day. Our final field exercise at the end of two weeks involved a full scale amphibious assault via period LVTs and LCIs on a heavily-defended beach. That was truly gratifying and as close as I’ll ever get to experiencing what our brothers in World War II faced on beachheads at places like Tarawa, Peleliu and Iwo Jima.

We paid meticulous attention to the details in uniforms, weapons, equipment and tactics. That’s an overdue tribute to the men who fought the great naval campaigns in the Pacific during World War II, Of course, there will be Marines, veterans and fans who will argue that we should have covered some of the other major Pacific battles. Vets of action with the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Marine Divisions might feel slighted, but we did include some sequences with the forming of the 5th MarDiv at Pendleton and we follow Basilone with that unit onto Iwo Jima where he was killed in action. It’s about all we could manage in bringing that under-appreciated, misunderstood and frequently forgotten aspect of World War II to life and to the attention of worldwide audiences.

There is one serious omission for which I should apologize, especially to this audience. Despite my best efforts, I never managed to talk the writers into including a Marine Corps Combat Correspondent in the action. But we did have a couple of real ones working behind the cameras and given our history and mission, I guess that’s the way it should be.

From the UK’s Daily Mail – 2/1/2010
By Christopher Leake, Mail On Sunday Home Affairs Editor

Erik Prince, recently outed as a participant in a C.I.A. assassination program, has gained notoriety as head of the military-contracting juggernaut Blackwater, a company dogged by a grand-jury investigation, bribery accusations, and the voluntary-manslaughter trial of five ex-employees, set for next month. Lashing back at his critics, the wealthy former navy seal takes the author inside his operation in the U.S. and Afghanistan, revealing the role he’s been playing in America’s war on terror…

Please Click Here to Read the Full Article

From a former Marine with an extensive network throughout the military and security communities

I feel compelled to write and disseminate this, because when I often read open-source media accounts of battlefield exploits involving US Soldiers, they are often lacking.

Here are the facts, without revealing sensitive information. I feel compelled to write this because I heard some very fine, brave Americans fought for their very lives Saturday, 03 OCT 09. They fought magnificently. Eight of them made the Ultimate Sacrifice. I don't know their names, only their call signs. Though it may have been smaller in scale, and shorter in duration, their battle was no less heroic than the exploits of their ancestors, in places like LZ X-Ray or Fire Base Ripcord in Vietnam. I want people to know that there are still some GREAT Americans who serve in the US Army, fighting for Freedom, who will probably never be given the due they deserve. I don't know ALL the facts, only what I overheard on the satellite radio.

COP Keating was (past tense) located on low ground, near a river, surrounded by mountains - a poor place to have to defend to begin with. The village of Kamdesh was nearby, as was a mosque. About two platoons and a cavalry troop headquarters occupied the COP - Combat Outpost. If you Google COP Keating, you will find a Washington Times article describing the austere conditions there, written earlier this year.

I was on duty from 0600-1800 (6 a.m. until 6 p.m.) on Saturday, 03 OCT 09, and heard, first-hand, the events I am about to recount transpire. I took notes as the battle unfolded. Things were relatively quiet when I came on shift at 0600. Not too long afterward, I heard a call sign describing taking small arms fire at his position. (That in itself is not alarming - I hear that frequently because I hear satellite radio transmissions from all sorts of units who operate in Nangahar, Kunar, Laghman (where I am) and in Nuristan Provinces, where this happened.) The situation, then began to deteriorate. The Troop Commander - urgently - requested rotary wing gunships to support him. He was told they were 45 minutes away, and that he should use his 120 mm mortars. He replied that the mortar pit was pinned down, and that the could not employ his 120 mm mortars. I did not know until I saw an aerial photo later that day, after I got off shift, that the COP was located in a "bowl," surrounded on nearly all sides by high ground. The insurgents were shooting down into the mortar pit from above. The 120 mm mortars from OP Fritshe, a few kilometers away were able to help a little, but it was not enough. Not too long after the fight started, the Troop Commander said that he had a KIA, and several wounded.

Uh-Oh - now this is getting serious. Not too much longer after that, the Troop Commander, in a voice that was not panicked, but which had a sense of urgency said, "We've got people inside our wire!!!" He said that he had lost communications with some of his elements at different places on the COP. He had to abandon his Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and all the various means of redundant communications there (MIRC Chat, Blue Force Tracker, tactical FM radios, etc.) His only means of communication was the satellite radio he was using. He said he urgently needed air support. The number of KIA began to climb.

He kept asking about the helicopters - his higher headquarters said they were "30 minutes out..." He said that if he did not get help soon, they were going to be overrun. He had consolidated the soldiers he had, to include dead and wounded, in a tight perimeter on part of his COP. He advised that the Afghan National Army (ANA) side of the COP was completely overrun and was on fire. The insurgents had gotten into his perimeter where the ANA latrine bordered his perimeter, after they had overrun the ANA camp. His Entry Control Point (ECP) where some Afghan Security Guards (ASG) had been had been overrun. The ANP Police Checkpoint had been overrun and he was taking a heavy volume of fire from that. He was taking a lot of RPG fire from the mosque. His Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) was under insurgent control. He kept asking about the helicopters. He was told, "Passing Checkpoint 12..."

He said, "I'm telling you that if they don't get here f***in' soon, we're all going to f***in' die!!!" Shortly after that, his Squadron Commander came up on the radio and told him that he was going to be OK, that help was on the way. The SCO said that he needed to come up on FM and talk to the helicopters, who should be arriving very soon.

The Troop Commander said that the Harris was all he had at the moment, and asked that the Squadron relay. It was, obviously, a very anxious time. I was afraid that at any moment, the Troop commander would just stop transmitting, and that would mean that they were likely all dead and dying. Someone asked the Troop commander what his target priorities were, and he said that "anything outside the wire" was controlled by bad guys. He mentioned that he needed gun runs at a particular wall, and mentioned certain Target Reference Points (TRP's) such as "the putting green" and "the diving board." Finally, the helicopters arrived and began killing insurgents. It became clear, however, that it was such a target-rich environment that much more air support was needed. The helicopters gave the defenders enough breathing room to better position themselves, reload, etc. Under the umbrella of the gunships, the Troop Commander said that he was going to try to re-take some of his camp. The SCO calmly encouraged him to "fire and maneuver." As they regained some lost ground, the Troop Commander said that he was finding some of his unaccounted for soldiers, and that they were KIA. He gave their battle roster numbers. Things were looking better, but it was still a fierce fight. I could hear a cacophony of machine gun fire when the Troop Commander keyed that microphone to talk. The mortars were still pinned down, with one KIA and wounded in the mortar pit. After only a short time, gunships had to leave to rearm and refuel, heading to FOB Bostic. (FOB Bostic was hit with indirect fire, also, throughout the day.)

The weather in the high passes interfered with the helicopters. Close Air Support in the form of jets were on the way, and the Troop Commander was asked to provide Target Numbers, which he did. He was still being pressed on all sides, still taking a heavy volume of small arms fire and RPG's. He had regained some buildings, but had not been able to re-capture all his perimeter. He found at least one MBITR and was able to communicate with aircraft a little better. Once the jets arrived overhead, they began to drop bombs on the masses, the swarms of insurgents. Usually, the insurgents conduct a raid at dawn, do their damage, and flee. Not this day. I looked at my watch, and it was after 1000 and the insurgents were still attacking, even though it should have become clear to them after the close air arrived that they could no longer hope to completely overrun the camp. The Close Air was on station continuously after that, and as soon as one plane dropped its bombs and strafed, another came down to hit targets - some very close to camp. The mosque was hit by a Hellfire, and open source now reports that a high profile insurgent named Dost Mohammad was killed there. A target described as a "switchback" was bombed repeatedly and the insurgents seemed to simply re-occupy it only to be bombed out of it again. (Several pieces of weapons and equipment has since been found there.) The "North Face" was also repeatedly bombed and strafed.

A plan was developed to get reinforcements to COP Keating. Because it was still "too hot" to land helicopters, they were flown to OP Fritshe and had to walk to COP Keating. Asked about his ammunition (Class 5) at about 1300, the Troop commander said that he was "red" on 7.62 link and MK19 ammunition (40mm grenade machinegun). Not too long after that, he stated that he was "black" (supply exhausted) on 7.62, but still had a lot of .50 caliber. More KIA were found, and the Troop Commander said that they were missing their sensitive items (weapons, night vision, MBITR radios - things like that.) The KIA number rose to 5. There were constant updates on a particular wounded Soldier who had a broken leg and a crushed pelvis. They said that he had lost a lot of blood, but was on an IV, and was "hanging in there." The Troop Commander said that he had two ANA KIA, and several wounded, still with him. He said that a lot of the ANA - about 12 - had broken and run when the COP began to be overrun. (Some of their bodies were found nearby the next day, along with some ASG who were wounded.) The Troop Commander said that the insurgents had made off with the ANA's B-10 Rocket Launcher. Throughout the day, the air support targeted a B-10 launch site, but it was unclear if it was the same system that the ANA had lost of not.

The SCO got on the net and said that there was a plan to bring in a CH-47 Chinook as soon as it got dark, with attack helicopters overhead, and that they would bring in ammo and Soldiers and evacuate the wounded and dead. The SCO said that he would fly in, also. During the battle, the SCO always seemed calm and gave a lot of encouragement to the Troop Commander on the ground. He asked for updates (Situation Reports - "SITREPS") but he did not nag the Troop Commander for it every 5 minutes. He let the Troop Commander fight the fight, frequently asking him what he needed and asking him how he and his Soldiers were doing, offering encouragement, but not micro managing.

The fighting continued all day, even though it was not as intense as it had been in the early morning. As the relief column approached from OP Fritshe, it got into a brief fight, quickly killing two insurgents and capturing their ICOM radios and RPG's. Then, they continued on toward COP Keating. The fire that had completely leveled the ANA side of the COP was spreading from building to building, and was setting the COP on fire. The Troop Commander and his Soldiers had to evacuate their TOC again, because it caught on fire. Many of the barracks buildings caught on fire and burned, taking the Soldiers' possessions with them. Only one or two buildings were left by the time it was over. As night approached, the Troop Commander told someone (S-3? FSO?) that if the air cover were lost, and if they were attacked again, they were "done." The Troop Commander was assured that he would have adequate air support. The CSM came up on the net and asked the Troop Commander to try to expand his perimeter in order to try to get accountability of everyone. The Troop Commander said that he "just can't do it, I just don't have enough people. I have too many wounded." The CSM said that he understood, but that he was looking at a cold body on the Predator feed near the maintenance building, and thought that that might be the final missing soldier. (It was later determined that was not him.) The Troop Commander said that there were "a lot" of dead insurgents lying dead inside his perimeter, and he could be seeing one of those.

I went off shift at 1800. At that time, there were 6 US KIA, and one missing, later found and determined to be KIA. I do not know where the 8th KIA came from: either one of the wounded died, or earlier there was a mistake in regard to accountability.

The next day (Sunday, 4 OCT) when I came to work, I learned that they had found the unaccounted-for Soldier(s) and had made it through the night. During the late morning, the SCO came up on the net and briefed someone about the situation. He said that of five (5) HMMWV's, only one was still running. They had counted eight (8) RPG impacts on one HMMWV alone. He said that the HMMWV's were shot all to pieces. The camp Bobcat had a window shot out, but was still running, and they were still using it to move things.

There was a lot of UXO's (unexploded ordnance) that made the area hazardous, such as unexploded US mortar rounds that had been scattered, as well as AT-4's and Javelin's. Most of the Soldiers on the COP had lost all their possessions except for what they were wearing. A plan was already being developed to get them new TA-50, uniforms, boots, toiletries, etc. once they were extracted. There were a lot of sensitive items that needed to be lifted out, because they are serial numbered items that needed to be accounted for, but most everything was ruined. They discussed whether to insert engineers with a lot of explosive to blow everything up, or whether to call in air strikes after everyone was evacuated and try to destroy what was left that way. Even at this point, they were still taking the occasional odd, angry shot or rocket fire.

As I type this, I am still listening to the folks who are left at COP Keating, figuring out what to destroy, how best to destroy it (demo vs. aerial bombs or rockets) what to fly out, and making a plan on how best to get that done so they can abandon and close the COP.

From www.mentalfloss.com. Sent to us by GySgt Guy H. MULLEN, USMC (Ret) via Col Wayne V. MORRIS and his WayMor, Inc. fee service list

This is weird and mesmerizing: ultra slow-motion video of bullets impacting various materials (glass, wood, metal, hollow-points on ballistics gel, and so on). The soundtrack adds nothing to the experience, so you might as well mute it (unless you want to have a rave while watching the video). But from a scientific perspective, there’s a lot of interesting stuff going on here…what was most interesting to me was watching the bullets instantly liquify when they hit hard surfaces (like harder metals). There are also several shots in which the bullets are impacted by other projectiles in mid-flight.

The best news: there’s nothing gross here, just very cleanly photographed bullet impacts on non-gross objects.

Positions at Stone Bay/Jacksonville, NC

The EMT-Bs shall provide live fire emergency medical support. Will serve as battlefield corpsman with the Marine Corps, rendering emergency medical treatment to include initial treatment in a training environment. Will provide necessary care for Marines in his/her group, including but not limited to their every-day ailments.

Must possess a current National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians (NREMT) certification and/ or a North Carolina State EMT certification. Must be prior military and have served as a corpsman or combat medic.

Demonstrate knowledge of standards, policies/procedures and treatment through integration of that knowledge into the delivery of care. Must be willing to maintain and enhance clinical practice skills by attending/participating in staff development and continuing education programs.

If you are interested please send your resume to Bree Lawrence at Bree_Lawrence@emainc.com